1972

mercoledì, novembre 16, 2005

Parlare in Giappone perché la Cina ascolti. Nel corso del suo viaggio asiatico Bush visiterà Giappone, Corea del Sud, Mongolia e Cina. Ma fin dal primo discorso pronunciato a Kyoto il presidente americano ha fatto chiaramente intendere le sue priorità. Chi temeva un Bush morbido sul caso cinese dovrà ricredersi: le sue parole sono state un piccolo capolavoro di diplomazia e fermezza, condito da qualche affondo niente male. Bush ha riconosciuto il valore delle riforme economiche di Pechino ma lo ha subito messo in contrapposizione con l'assenza di progressi dal punto di vista delle libertà civili e politiche:

As China reforms its economy, its leaders are finding that once the door to freedom is opened even a crack, it cannot be closed.
As the people of China grow in prosperity, their demands for political freedom will grow as well.

I have pointed out that the people of China want more freedom to express themselves — to worship without state control — and to print Bibles and other sacred texts without fear of punishment. The efforts of China's people to improve their society should be welcomed as part of China's development. By meeting the legitimate demands of its citizens for freedom and openness, China's leaders can help their country grow into a modern, prosperous, and confident nation.

Ma il punto fondamentale del suo discorso, quello destinato a colpire nello stomaco i despoti cinesi, si chiama Taiwan:

The people of Taiwan for years lived under a restrictive political state that gradually opened up the economy. This opening to world markets transformed the island into one of the world's most important trading powers. Economic liberalization in Taiwan helped fuel its desire for individual political freedom because men and women who are allowed to control their own wealth will eventually insist on controlling their own lives and their future.
Modern Taiwan is free and democratic and prosperous. By embracing freedom at all levels, Taiwan has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese society.

Chi ha concepito quella frase - a free and democratic Chinese society - è un genio. Non esiste un'eccezione cinese, non ci sono scuse:

The advance of freedom in Asia has been one of the greatest stories in human history and in the young century now before us we will add to that story.

In the 21st century, freedom is an Asian value because it is a universal value. It is freedom that enables the citizens of Asia to lead lives of dignity. It is freedom that has unleashed the creative talents of the Asian people. It is freedom that gives the citizens of this continent confidence in a future of peace for their children and grandchildren. And in the work that lies ahead, the people of this region can know: You have a partner in the American government and a friend in the American people.

A Zhongnanhai dicono di no, ma il messaggio dev'essere arrivato forte e chiaro.

Ross Terrill intanto (non perdetevi mai i suoi articoli) fa il punto sulla tanto sbandierata - e temuta - ascesa cinese e sulle sue conseguenze per gli Stati Uniti: il secolo di Pechino oscurerà Washington? Calma e sangue freddo, suggerisce Terrill, la realtà è un'altra:

The US economy is seven times the size of China's and the Japanese economy is three times China's. Not least, China is a Leninist regime -- the kind that mostly went up in a puff of smoke 15 years ago.

Le ambizioni sono certamente quelle della superpotenza, ma da cosa dipende l'effettiva realizzazione di questo obiettivo?

But China also has two dubious goals. One is to replace the United States as the chief source of influence in East Asia. Hence Chinese efforts to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States and Chinese whispers in Australian ears that Canberra would be better off looking only to Asia and not across the Pacific. The other is to ''regain" territories that Beijing feels fall within its sovereignty. These include not only Taiwan but a large number of islands east and south of China and, eventually, portions of the Russian Far East to which Beijing has laid territorial claims in the past.
Whether Beijing can achieve these goals depends on how long its rigid political system can survive, and on the reaction of other powers to China's ambitions.

Sulla prima variabile:

China's economy may continue to grow at its present rate. Or China may retain its Leninist party state. But it can hardly do both. Either the economic or the political logic will soon gain the upper hand.

Sulla seconda:

The United States will not allow an authoritarian China to become the new world leader and has allies to call on. Japan's new assertiveness and India's weight are major factors. And should Beijing seek to pursue a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine in Asia, Washington could also count on Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam for balancing weight.

Il dualismo possibile:

There are two Chinas, after all. A command economy that sags and a free economy that soars. A Communist Party that scratches for a raison d'etre and 1.3 billion individuals with private agendas. Being wary of authoritarian China yet engaging with emerging China is a reasonable dualism.

Conclusione rassicurante e condivisibile:

In Beijing, Shanghai, Xian, and Chongqing, on two recent visits, I found less talk of China being near to eclipsing the United States than I do on US campuses and in the US media. Overall, China may not be the new colossus it appears to its self-made foes or to distant lotus-eaters. A Leninist-ruled Chinese superpower eclipsing the United States is not on the horizon.

Occhi aperti, comunque.

postato da enzreale | permalink |

A Fabio. A Luisa.