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1972
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mercoledì, ottobre 27, 2004
Quelle armi. A parte tutto il resto, a pensarci bene la scomparsa degli esplosivi conduce a conclusioni un po’ diverse da quelle di Kerry & Co.
WSJ: One possibility is that it's a relative non-story. Several hundred tons of missing high-grade explosives may seem like a big deal. But that has to be viewed in the context of the hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives the U.S. has already seized and the many thousand tons more that may remain hidden. The second possibility is that the story is every bit as important as Mr. Kerry alleges, just not in the way he means. Al-Qaqaa is known to have been one of the sites where Saddam pursued his nuclear projects in the 1980s; throughout the 1990s it remained under control of Hussein Kamal's Military Industrial Council, the umbrella ministry tasked with developing Iraq's WMD capabilities. That seems like reasonable evidence that Saddam remained bent on developing a nuclear bomb, retained at least some of the ingredients to make one and therefore posed a "grave and gathering threat" to the peace of the world. TCS: Kerry and Edwards say that Bush didn't do enough to prevent the disappearance of the explosives, which could be used against Americans here at home. But the very existence of such explosives -- whether defined as weapons of mass destruction or not -- was the reason Bush led the nation into Iraq in the first place. Now, as a result of his exploitation of the questionable New York Times story, we know a bit more. The clear implication is that, in a Kerry administration, the 380 tons of weapons would not have been lost; they would have been secured -- even without an invasion. A miracle! |
A Fabio.
A Luisa.   
  Asia e dintorni Normblog |
