1972

venerdì, aprile 04, 2008

Tra Buddha e nazione.
Ideazione qualche giorno fa aveva provato a lanciare il sasso ma in Italia il giornalismo ufficiale non ha molta voglia di misurarsi con i dilettanti e preferisce temi più convenzionali e dibattiti ristretti. D'altra parte da un paese in cui il confronto fra i candidati alla presidenza del consiglio avviene in stanze ed in momenti diversi ed i professionisti dell'informazione si genuflettono di fronte alle peripezie ideologiche della figlia del nuovo dittatore cubano non è che si possa sperare molto di più.
In ogni caso uno degli aspetti più interessanti della rivolta tibetana - almeno a mio parere - è la ridefinizione di concetti che apparivano scolpiti nella storia, quello di nonviolenza ad esempio, o l'essenza stessa del buddhismo. Non occorre essere esperti di religioni orientali - e chi scrive non lo è - per rendersi conto che esiste una contraddizione tra il modello e la realtà nell'interpretazione di certe filosofie (nel senso ampio del termine). Sul buddhismo militante si sofferma Denis Gray, inserendolo nell'opportuno contesto storico:

“In modern times, preaching is not enough. Monks must act to improve society, to remove evil,” says Samdhong Rinpoche, prime minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile and a high-ranking lama.

Indeed, the activism by monks reflects another side of Buddhist history. Despite the faith’s image of passivity, an aggressive strain has long existed, especially in the Mahayana school of Buddhism, practiced in Japan, Korea, China and Tibet.

“Use peaceful means where they are appropriate, but where they are not appropriate, do not hesitate to resort to more forceful means,” said the previous, now deceased Dalai Lama when Tibet fought the Chinese in the 1930s.

Loosely affiliated but global, originating at the grass roots rather than atop religious hierarchies and more muscular than meditative, this movement is widely known as Engaged Buddhism.

Su un piano distinto ma collegato l'analisi di Asia Times a proposito delle differenze sempre più evidenti all'interno del fronte tibetano:

Promptly dismissing the charge of attempting to sabotage the Olympic torch relay, the Dalai Lama said he has always supported Beijing's bid to host the Games - an historic event that will make more than one billion Chinese proud. Less supportive is Tsewang Rigzin, the president of the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) - an exiled Tibetan organization that advocates independence for Tibet - who, when interviewed by foreign media, has admitted outright that his group plans to disrupt the torch rally on Mount Everest. According to statements, they will press multinationals to withdraw their sponsorship of the Beijing Olympics and send teams to brief foreign athletes on the Tibet issue.

Some young Tibetans, refusing to accept the Dalai Lama’s middle-of-the-road line, not only insist on advocating independence for Tibet but also on using violent means for the purpose.

The then TYC president, Tseten Norbu, claimed in interviews that the “middle-of-the-road” line took into consideration interests of both Tibetans and Chinese, but the TYC would only consider the former’s interests and would use every available means including terrorism to end the Chinese Communist Party’s rule in Tibet.

Ovviamente il contrario di nonviolenza non è necessariamente violenza, anche se nel cliché della stampa internazionale le sfumature faticano ad emergere.

Poi c'è un altro fattore, quello del nazionalismo. Mentre Barry Sautman lo affronta in un'ottica chiaramente (e fastidiosamente) pro-Cina, Jim Yardley fa notare come, quando si tratta di Tibet, Giappone o Taiwan, ovvero della proiezione cinese fuori dai propri confini, il regime possa contare su un appoggio quasi unanime, ovviamente manipolato dalla propaganda e per questo particolarmente inquietante:

But the heavy emphasis on nationalism is not without risks. With less than five months before the opening of the Beijing Olympics, China's sharp criticism of the foreign media comes precisely when it wants to present a welcoming impression to the outside world. Instead, Chinese citizens, including many overseas, are posting thousands of angry messages on Web sites and making crank calls to some foreign media offices in Beijing.

But the Tibet crisis has touched directly on the raw nerve of separatism at the core of Chinese nationalism. Tibet is usually a low-profile issue within China, especially compared with Taiwan. But most Chinese, influenced by the government, are interpreting the Tibetan crisis as an attempt to split China.

"You can see the propaganda machine operating in full gear," Liu said. "That shows the true nature of the government. It hasn't changed at all."

Party leaders know the volatility of nationalism from 2005. The government tried to control - some would say manipulate - the anti-Japanese protests that escalated during a tense diplomatic tussle between China against Japan. But the protests became violent and grew so rapidly that the government finally forced them to end.

Un'arma a doppio taglio che alla fine ha sempre portato sfortuna ai regimi autoritari.

postato da enzreale | permalink |

A Fabio. A Luisa.