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1972
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martedì, gennaio 27, 2004
Continua dal post precedente. Sulle parole di David Kay le analisi più efficaci arrivano ancora una volta dai blog.
La sensazione è che ormai da lì si debba passare per cercare di capire qualcosa al di là della confusione che ormai è diventata la norma per i media tradizionali. I colleghi americani hanno fatto quello che molto più modestamente anche noi avevamo tentato ieri: confrontare le fonti di (dis)informazione e cercare di decifrare il senso delle successive interviste rilasciate da Kay. Via Instapundit tre link preziosi (citiamo alcuni passaggi ma andrebbero letti per intero): JunkYardBlog Now, how do we square Kay's comments here with his comments to Coughlin stating that Iraq probably shipped some banned weapons to Syria? How can Saddam ship weapons that do not exist? I don't know, but it seems to me that in these stories there is a glaring conflict--either the weapons existed or they didn't. Kay says in one story that they did exist and are probably in Syria; in another, he says they didn't exist at all. The next reporter to interview him should try and reconcile these conflicting stories, which are coming from the same weapons hunter. We still have no evidence for what happened to those weapons, which everyone from Hans Blix to Jacques Chirac to John Kerry and George W. Bush agreed existed prior to the war. That's what we need to find out. And that's the one thing that Kay says in both the Coughlin and Lindlaw stories--we need to find out what happened to those weapons, because Saddam never offered proof that he had destroyed them. All of that makes sense--the post-war chaos possibly allowing some theft or smuggling, the possible freezing of some Iraqi programs until the UN could be persuaded to lift sanctions and, eventually, the US-UK no-fly zone enforcements, and the possible movement of weapons to Syria. It squares well with what we know about Saddam--not that he would simply stop producing weapons, but that he could try and keep as much activity going as possible. The point is, if Kay himself insists that the weapons did exist, why did Lindlaw lead with Kay saying they didn't? Dust in the Light More than that, he suggests that, focusing on the WMD component of the argument, the President and the nation as a whole were justified in going to war on the basis of the information that was available. His admonition is that we must understand why our intelligence failed in order to fix it... Having stated that he believes it was reasonable, before the war, to characterize the threat as imminent, Kay offers this intriguing statement: I must say, I actually think what we learned during the inspections made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the war. You can listen for yourself (it's at 11:50 in the streaming audio), but to my ear, Ms. Hansen's stutter and redirect back to "imminent" has the sound of a woman ushering one boyfriend out of a room in which another hides. What that stutter indicates — symbolizes — is that the ambiguity is certain to be exacerbated, even nourished, by the media, as the primary source is skewed and all subsequent coverage pushes the story closer and closer to what the reporters want it to be. That, at least, is not surprising. But I'd sure like somebody to investigate what Kay meant by that. Bill Hobbs Here are some things to consider. 1.Saddam failed to comply with numerous U.N. resolutions regarding WMD. He acted as if he had the weapons, and as if he refused to willingly disarm. 2. The intel on WMD that the Bush administration used to justify the war was, largely, identical to intel on which the previous administration used to justifiy its policies and actions toward Iraq. Indeed, former President Clinton said two weeks ago in Portugal that he believed Saddam retained WMD right up to the start of the war. 3. Kay is not the only expert to believe Saddam may have sent WMD to Syria in advance of the invasion. 4. Kay's survey team found ample evidence of ongoing WMD programs - the existence of which alone justified military enforcement of U.N. Res. 1441. Robert Tagorda riporta diversi stralci dell'intervista alla NPR Liane Hansen: In that light, then, Representative Jane Harman, who's the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, said Friday: "... [T]he President owes the American public and the world an explanation." And your statement would have fit into what she had heard from you before. So does the President owe the American public an explanation for this idea of the ambiguity -- why the search didn't find stockpiles of WMDs in Iraq? Kay: Well, I actually think the intelligence community owes the President, rather than the President owing the American people. We have to remember that this view of Iraq was held during the Clinton administration, and didn't change in the Bush administration. It is not a political "got-you" issue. It is a serious issue of how you could come to the conclusion that is not matched by the future. Ancora: Kay: Well, it's quite clear, before the war, it was reasonable for people to think "imminent" meant "a very short order," because you assessed that they had those weapons. After the war, and with the inspection effort that we have carried out now for nine months, I think we all agree that there were not large amounts of weapons available for "imminent" action. That's not the same thing as saying it was not a serious imminent threat that you're not willing to run for the nation. That is a political judgment, not a technical judgment. [Emphasis added.] I strongly recommend that you listen to the entire thirteen-minute interview, which captures the nuances of Kay's views. He strikes me as a pretty objective fellow. It'd be a shame, I think, if we end up misunderstanding him because of subpar reporting. Ognuno può giudicare da solo ma a noi sembra un po’ diverso da come ce l’hanno raccontato i notiziari. Fra due giorni arriva il rapporto Hutton. Ne leggeremo delle belle. |
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